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George Herbert Mead and the Unity
of the Self
Mitchell Aboulafia
1 George Herbert Mead failed to make his mark with a singular account of the self. In part
this was due to the fact that he never published a book on the topic,  only a limited
number of articles. His most important book on the subject, Mind, Self, and Society: from the
Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, was edited and published posthumously, and based on
student notes.1 But this only begins to address the problem. Although we will never know
if Mead would have carefully clarified his use of the term “self” in a monograph, we do
know that the term has different meanings in the works that are available. Some of these
usages  can  be  explained  by  context  and  present  only  minimal  difficulties  of
interpretation. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. There are genuine tensions and
challenging questions about the ways in which the term is employed. Mead, for instance,
thought that the self must involve some sort of unity, the most famous example of which
is the unified self that arises in relationship to a generalized other. However, even here
questions  immediately  arise,  for  one  wants  to  know  how  the  selves  of  different
generalized others relate to each other, especially given the fact that generalized others
differ  in  their  range,  complexity,  and  levels  of  abstraction.  Do  more  comprehensive
generalized  others  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  selves  of  their  less  encompassing
brethren or do they undermine their character? 
2 I will be exploring Mead’s various uses of the term self.2 I do not believe that we will ever
be in a position to provide a univocal definition, if only because Mead himself appears to
accept  the  fact  that  there  are  contexts  in  which  the  word  can  and  should  be  used
differently. There is, however, an overarching vision that ties his most innovative uses of
the term together, including the manner in which he thinks about systems as open
systems. But in addition to Mead the theorist of systems and novelty, there is also the
Mead who assumes that narrative plays a significant role in unifying the self, although
this aspect of Mead’s thought remains almost entirely implicit. Mead’s dependence on a
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notion of narrative can help explain why he so often assumes that there is a unity to the
self without making the grounds for this unity explicit. 
3 Two questions guide this examination of Mead’s ideas: what kinds of unity or continuity
are characteristic  of  selves? And is  there a form of  unity – a  “meta-self” –  that  can
encompass the types of selves that we find in Mead? In response to the second question, I
demonstrate that Mead had a narrative account of the self, one that has the potential to
incorporate different kinds of selves, although Mead left his account underdeveloped. A
methodological  point  before  addressing  the  questions  at  hand:  This  article  tries  to
provide a plausible account of how we might understand the unity of the self for Mead. In
doing so it draws on a range of his writings and lectures from approximately the last two
decades of his life. It is perhaps best understood as a piece of detective work. The clues
are the various ways Mead spoke about the self in his lectures and writings. However,
because there is no authoritative edition of his collected works – for example, questions
have been raised about the accuracy of the presentation of his ideas in the edited lectures
– and because Mead’s language can be imprecise, there is no final verdict regarding the
questions at hand, although I have sought to minimize the chance of a misreading by
appealing to ideas that recur in Mead’s work.
⁂
4 Let us assume that we have an obligation to keep our promises. Let us also assume that
the notions of self-assertion, self-respect, and self-realization can have meaning even if
one does not believe in an essential self, a substantive self, or a soul. We will accept these
claims for the present because George Herbert Mead supports them.
It is interesting to go back into one’s inner consciousness and pick out what it is
that  we  are  apt  to  depend  upon  in  maintaining  our  self-respect.  There  are,  of
course,  profound  and  solid  foundations.  One  does  keep  his  word,  meet  his
obligations;  and  that  provides  a  basis  for  self-respect.  But  those  are  characters
which obtain in most of the members of the community with whom we have to do.
We all fall down at certain points, but on the whole we always are people of our
words.  We  do  belong  to  the  community  and  our  self-respect  depends  on  our
recognition of ourselves as such self-respecting individuals. But that is not enough
for us, since we want to recognize ourselves in our differences from other persons.
[…] [T]here is a demand, a constant demand, to realize one’s self in some sort of
superiority over those about us. (MSS: 204-5)
5 Who or what self seeks to realize him or herself in this fashion? It is not at all obvious
how Mead would address this question, and this is no small matter. In this passage we
find  references  to  self-realization,  self-respect,  self-assertion,  and  the  keeping  of
promises. But what self is realizing itself, what self is an object or subject of self-respect,
what self  tries  to outshine others,  what self  knows that  failing to keep a promise is
wrong? Is it the same self at any given time? For Mead, individuals can have multiple
social selves, which are linked to groups and communities. Is there a unity or continuity
to the self, a type of meta-self, that transcends these social selves, and if so, how are we to
understand it? 
6 Perhaps trying to locate any sort of meta or comprehensive self in Mead – one who might
find the breaking of promises a violation of his or her integrity – is simply wrongheaded.
Mead’s use of the term self has given rise to something of a cottage industry that seeks to
explain what the self  truly is  for Mead.  After seventy-five years of  Mead scholarship
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maybe it is time to cease trying to determine what Mead really meant by the term self, let
alone whether there is a type of meta-self. For example, we know that the self is often a
social  and  cognizable  object,  the  “me.”3 At  other  times  it  is  the  combination of  the
conventional “me” and the impulsive and spontaneous “I.”4 Mead is often emphatic about
how the self excludes the body, because the self is a cognizable social object. But then he
is willing to speak of an unconscious self, which is made up of bundles of habits, and we
know that habits are closely linked to bodily dispositions.5 Mead also tells us that, “As a
mere organization of habit the self is not self-conscious. It is this self which we refer to as
character.”6
7 It is possible that in using the term self in a variety of ways Mead may have been taking
his cue from William James.7 In the Principles of Psychology James describes different types
of selves: “The constituents of the Self may be divided into two classes, those which make up
respectively – (a) The material Self; (b) The social Self; (c) The spiritual Self; and (d) The
pure Ego.”8 There is, however, one very significant difference between James and Mead.
James’s account of the self or selves is carefully articulated in one of the most influential
books in psychology and philosophy of the nineteenth century. Mead’s usages are spread
over a corpus of published and unpublished works, and discovering all of them seems to
require the efforts of a Sherlock Holmes. (Ah, Mr. Mead, caught yet again with another
self!) 
8 However, the fact that Mead used the term in different ways does not undermine the
possibility that he may have had a notion of a meta or comprehensive self. As a matter of
fact, his willingness to use the term self in so many ways argues for leaving the door open
to this possibility. It would be difficult to appreciate his commitment to self-realization
and self-assertion, for example, if we were to restrict their relevance to selves that exist
only in relationship to specific communities.9 Nor would limiting these notions to the
domain of  the impulsive and spontaneous “I”  do justice to the ways in which Mead
employs them. These notions, and others that we will encounter, appear to point to a self
that eludes definition solely in terms of the particularity of specific communities, even
large ones, and the spontaneity of the “I.” 
9 In  my  view,  Mead  was  not  fully  successful  in  articulating  the  nature  of  a  meta  or
comprehensive self, although his insights are fertile, which is one reason why his thought
is still vital. Mead, for example, has the potential to assist those seeking to reinvigorate
and rethink sentiment theory and the role of empathy in moral development, as well as
to  challenge simulation theorists.10 Through Mead’s  sensitivity  to  the  ways  in  which
sociality  informs  self  development  his  work  can  complement  well-known  narrative
accounts of the self in thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles
Taylor. It can also complement these accounts because narrative, as we shall see, is an
important  feature  of  Mead’s  understanding  of  the  self,  although  he  focuses  more
attention on the intersection of behavior and ontogenesis than these thinkers. But before
turning to a discussion of narrative, we need to clarify further Mead’s concerns and his
notions about the self. 
10 Dewey tells us in his “Prefatory Remarks” to the Philosophy of the Present that, “When I
first came to know Mr. Mead, well over forty years ago, the dominant problem in his
mind concerned the nature of consciousness as personal and private.”11 But Mead was not
primarily  interested  in  doing  a  phenomenology  of  this  consciousness.  He  wished  to
explore how the so-called personal  was connected to the public  and common world.
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Dewey goes on to say that the idealism of Mead’s early years did not provide Mead with
the answers he needed.
Even if it [idealism-M.A.] were true and were accepted as such, it did not explain
how  states  of  mind  peculiar  to  an  individual,  like  the  first  hypotheses  of  a
discoverer which throw into doubt beliefs previously entertained and which deny
objectivity  to  things  that  have  been  universally  accepted  as  real  objects,  can
function as  the sources  of  objects  which instead of  being private  and personal,
instead of being merely “subjective,” belong to the common and objective universe.
(Dewey 1932: xxxvii)
11 One way in which Mead undermines a rigid dichotomy between the me and not-me,
which James insists on in his Principles of Psychology, and between the private and public,
involves articulating how the unique or novel,  which is  generated by the individual,
becomes integrated into a wider community.12 Mead thought that societies depend on the
novel responses of individuals to the accepted, to the given, in order to change, in a
manner  somewhat  analogous  to  how  eco-systems  change  if  new,  yet  compatible,
organisms or mutations are introduced. These novel responses are the terrain of what he
came to call the “I.” However, the question of overcoming a split between the so-called
subjective and objective worlds is rendered even more challenging when the integration
of  the subjective and the objective,  the personal  and the public,  is  burdened with a
parallel question: how does a self,  which has a public dimension, maintain a unity or
continuity in the face of the individual’s own novel, personal, responses? 
12 In part because of Mead’s commitment to novelty, one solution that was not available to
him in addressing the unity of the self is the notion that we have one basic fixed role or
self  that  defines us.  This  is  apparent if  we contrast  Mead with a pre-modern figure,
Epictetus.13 According to Epictetus, we must all learn to play the role that Destiny has set
for us. 
Remember that you are an actor in a drama, which is as the playwright wishes; if
the playwright wishes it short, it will be short; if long, then long; if the playwright
wishes you to play a beggar, [it is assigned] in order that you good-naturedly play
even that role; [and similarly] if [you are assigned to play] a disabled person, an
archon, or a lay person. For this is what is yours: to play finely the role (πρόσωπον)
that is given; but to select [that role] itself is another’s [i.e., the divine playwright].
(Epictetus, Ench.: 17)14 
13 Commentators have considered roles as well played for Epictetus where an individual
demonstrates universal virtues in carrying them out. But a question arises about whether
success in roles should be understood solely in terms of universal virtues or whether
there is something specific that allows a role to be successfully realized, for example, is
Socrates or Hercules exhibiting some unique personal attributes, in addition to universal
virtues?15 In a recent article on this topic, Brian Johnson tells us that scholars are divided
on this question,  with most assuming that universal virtues trump all  else,  which he
refers to as the deflationary account.16 Johnson wants to argue for another position.
For Epictetus, then, our humanity appears to be a composite fact because we have a
share  in
λόγος, which connects us to cosmic nature, and because we have a body in a certain
place and time, which means that we are susceptible to illness and a variety of
material needs and that we must live among others and the consequences of their
actions. As a result, our humanity cannot act as sole standard, as the deflationary
model would have it, because it has 
many  influences  acting  upon  it;  this  multiplicity  undermines  the  deflationary
model.  Thus,  Epictetus  does  not  say  to  agents  “Here  is  a  universal  (human)
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standard,  apply  it  to  your  differing  circumstances,”  as  the  deflationary  view
suggests; rather, he says “The universe needs these different functions, so here are
your specific stations.” (cf. I 29.26-28, iii 22.4-8, and iii 24.94-95)17
14 If one were to ask what is involved in persons fulfilling their stations in extraordinary
ways for Epictetus, in addition to the presence of the logos, it is how well they play their
roles. And it is role playing all the way down here, for there is no essential, particular,
personal self behind a role. However, the fact that there are different roles is problematic
for this model because although a particular station should ultimately define us – for
example, Socrates as gadfly as opposed to Socrates as father – in our actual lives we are
typically called on to perform more than one role.18 Can Socrates remain true to himself
by being anything other than a gadfly or a wise man as deeply and as fully as possible?
For Epictetus, it would seem not. And his Socrates appears to have much in common with
Arendt’s, in spite of the different reasons they might give for why consistency is to be
prized.
This principle of agreement with oneself is very old; it was actually discovered by
Socrates, whose central tenet, as formulated by Plato, is contained in the sentence:
“Since I am one, it is better for me to disagree with the whole world than to be in
disagreement  with  myself.”  From this  sentence  both  Occidental  ethics,  with  its
stress upon being in agreement with one’s own conscience, and Occidental logic,
with its emphasis upon the axiom of contradiction, took their starting point.19
15 Although the unity here transcends the defining of oneself by a role, the price we pay for
this transcendence would be too high for Mead, because it appears to require too much
inner harmony. Nevertheless, it is difficult to dismiss the notion that at some level a self
must be in agreement with itself, and this is true for Mead, as we shall see. While we don’t
yet know how Mead understands this agreement, we do know that because we are called
on to play numerous roles, as well as confront our own novel responses, the solution of
going more deeply into one role would not be a satisfactory solution to the problem of
how to be in agreement with oneself. 
16 The absence of the logos for Mead makes much of the debate surrounding Epictetus moot.
As for the question about the relationship of roles to each other, Mead would reply that a
role is not a fully developed self. The self exists at a more complex level of organization.
His  whole  analysis  of  the  distinction  between  play  and  the game  is  based  on  this
assumption.20 But if we are not unified by being a specific role all the way down, and if we
have no essence, and if we are unable to appeal to an overarching logos to help define us,
how then are we to understand the unity or continuity of the self?
17 The most recurrent solution that Mead gives to the question of the unity of the self
involves viewing it as a function of a social group, so that the self is directly linked to the
generalized other. In Mead’s words, “The organized community or social group which
gives to the individual his unity of self may be called ‘the generalized other’.”21 In these
cases the self is the “me,” and it can be understood as a complex set of behaviors or roles
systemically organized. We can have multiple selves of this sort. There is an emphasis on
the self as an object here, to which one can reflexively relate.
18 However, Mead now has an obvious problem, which to some extent parallels Epictetus’s
problem of  multiple and potentially conflicting roles.  How are we to understand the
relationships between the different generalized others, the different social selves, which
individuals presumably possess? Mead was of two minds about the notion of multiple
personalities or selves. On the one hand, he thought multiple personalities quite normal,
in  the sense  in which we have different  “selves,”  identities,  based on the organized
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groups or communities of which we are members. On the other hand, it should be seen as
pathological when there is no connection between these personalities or selves. “Multiple
personality is  the breakup of  the personality or self;  there is  no background for the
organization of memory.”22 
19 The notion of multiple personality,  or what today is often referred to as Dissociative
Identity Disorder (DID), is a hornet’s nest. There are ongoing debates not only about its
etiology, but about whether it should even be viewed as a distinct disorder. We need not
concern ourselves with these debates. The question before us is which self breaks into
different personalities or selves, according to Mead. Is it just one of a number of different
social selves that fractures? To say that a multiple personality refers to a single fractured
social self among a multitude of selves would indeed be a peculiar use of the phrase. It
would localize the phenomenon too much. From Mead’s vantage point, it would be to
suggest that a self that one has in one social setting, say, as a member of a baseball team,
could develop a multiple personality that would be confined to that setting. Further, we
would then be left with the possibility of multiple multiple personality disorders if more
than one of our social selves fractured, that is, if distinct social monads split in their own
domains.23 Mead’s comments on multiple personality at minimum open the door to the
possibility that there is a unity to the self that transcends individual generalized others
and their social selves, a more comprehensive self that might split, that might become
schizoid.
20 As a matter of fact, Mead argues in various places that selves generated in relationship to
specific social groups can be united into more comprehensive unities. Here is a passage
from his “1914 Lectures on Social Psychology.”
There is a tendency still further to bring all of these different selves within a single
self. We get that in the “abstract man,” but there are others; “citizen” may include
the  other  selves.  This  tendency  to  organize  the  different  selves  is  essential  for
normal social conduct. There are relative degrees of dissociation in all of us. This
self which takes in all the different selves is still the self that answers to the others.
It is not the primary self but the composite. Out of such selves arise conceptions of
the political man, the economic man, the object of charity, etc.24
21 Notice that Mead emphasizes that there is a tendency to unify or organize different selves
into a single self, which can also be seen in the following remark, if we are willing to
equate the notion of a “whole man” with a kind of self. “We legitimately have different
selves over against different groups, and there is a natural organization among these
which makes us a whole man.”25 The notion of a more comprehensive or enlarged self is
one that Mead discusses in different places, and not only in these lectures. It is often
implied in his discussions of various communities.26 So one answer to what self might be
split into multiple personalities is the composite self, a more comprehensive organization
of elementary or localized selves.  We will  return to this suggestion shortly.  But first
notice how Mead contrasts the social secondary self with the primary self. 
All the secondary selves – voter, church member, father – are related just as the
different  groups  in  society  are  related.  The  organization  of  this  inner  social
consciousness is a reflex of the organization of the outer world. Secondly, there is a
relation between these various secondary selves to the primary self which belongs to action.
[…] An idea comes to us that does not come from the mouths of the selves that are
presenting the case but from the primary self. The new attitude is a suggestion. We
may be able to account for it after the act.27 (Emphasis added)
22 In introducing a primary self, as opposed to a secondary self, in these lectures, Mead
leaves us with a further difficulty. It appears that not only does the unity of the self or
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selves exist on different levels, some more comprehensive than others, there are also two
selves, primary and secondary. The primary self has attributes of what Mead came to
refer to more consistently as the “I,” while the secondary self can be equated with the
“me.” However,  in spite of often treating the “me” and the self  as synonymous – he
asserts that the “I” is not the self, even though it shares attributes with the primary self28
– Mead also viewed the “I” and “me” taken together as the self,  or more exactly,  as
“phases in the self,” a phrase that he uses at the end of the passage below. In other words,
the “I” and “me” are not seen as two selves, as the language of primary and secondary
selves would suggest, but as phases of one self.29 
Both aspects of the “I” and “me” are essential to the self in its full expression. […]
We speak of a person as a conventional individual; his ideas are exactly the same as
those of his neighbors; he is hardly more than a “me” under the circumstances; his
adjustments  are  only  the  slight  adjustments  that  take  place,  as  we  say,
unconsciously. Over against that there is the person who has a definite personality,
who replies to the organized attitude in a way which makes a significant difference.
With such a person it is the “I” that is the more important phase of the experience.
Those two constantly appearing phases are the important phases in the self. (MSS: 199-200;
emphasis added)
23 Recall  that in addition to the selves currently under discussion,  Mead referred to an
unconscious self and claimed that the self could be equated with character.30 One simple
way out  of  this  morass  of  different  selves  would be to  say that  Mead or  those who
transcribed his lectures and edited his work were careless. Or that his appeal to different
selves in different contexts only follows the pluralistic usage of the term that we found in
James, and there is no notion of a meta-self in Mead’s thought. But this is too easy. There
are  too many pieces  of  evidence that  suggest  that  Mead actually  did  think of  us  as
possessing some sort  of  meta or  comprehensive self.  At  minimum we are  unified as
composite social selves, and if not unified at least potentially continuous in terms of the
“I”  and  “me”  phases  in  the  self.  Returning  to  that  nagging  question  of  how  Mead
understood multiple personalities will be of assistance in addressing the question of a
more comprehensive or meta-self. 
The unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social
process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects
the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the
individual is implicated. […] The phenomenon of dissociation of personality is caused by a
breaking up of the complete, unitary self into the component selves of which it is composed,
and  which  respectively  correspond to  different  aspects  of  the  social  process  in
which the person is involved, and within which his complete or unitary self has
arisen; these aspects being the different social groups to which he belongs within
that process. (MSS: 144; emphasis added)31
24 So perhaps we are done. Even if we acknowledge that the self has phases of the “I” and
“me,” thus far it appears that the most comprehensive unity that we can find in Mead, if
we include selves that are generated in relationship to past or imagined communities, is
the composite unitary self, composed of component or elementary selves.32 Yet this does
not appear to account for all that Mead has to say on the subject. It appears that there is a
unity that is potentially more encompassing than the composite self, and digging deeper
into Mead’s views on multiple personality will assist in revealing it. 
⁂
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25 Mead claims that in persons who are unstable the personality can split into two selves,
each with distinct “I’s” and “me’s.” 
To a person who is somewhat unstable nervously and in whom there is a line of
cleavage,  certain  activities  become  impossible,  and  that  set  of  activities  may
separate  and  evolve  another  self.  Two  separate  “me’s” and  “I’s,”  two  different
selves, result, and that is the condition under which there is a tendency to break up
the personality. (MSS: 143) 
26 Mead immediately provides the following example, presumably to illustrate his point, but
which actually opens up the path to another way of thinking about the self. 
There is an account of a professor of education who disappeared, was lost to the
community, and later turned up in a logging camp in the West. He freed himself of
his occupation and turned to the woods where he felt, if you like, more at home.
The pathological side of it was the forgetting, the leaving out of the rest of the self.
This result involved getting rid of certain bodily memories which would identify
the individual to himself. We often recognize the lines of cleavage that run through
us. We would be glad to forget certain things, get rid of things the self is bound up
with in past experiences. What we have here is a situation in which there can be
different selves, and it is dependent upon the set of social reactions that is involved
as to which self we are going to be. If we can forget everything involved in one set
of activities, obviously we relinquish that part of the self. (MSS: 143)
27 To interpret the somewhat tortured language of these passages, it must first be noted
that there are at least two usages of the word self. One refers to the interactive unity of an
“I”-“me” as a self; the other to a more comprehensive self that can include memories
associated with more than one “I”-“me” self.  Mead appears to be suggesting that the
professor’s personality was split into two “I’s and two corresponding “me’s,” and one
organized set, one self, was lost when he settled in the West. Further, there is something
wrong with this state of affairs. “The pathological side of it was the forgetting, the leaving
out of the rest of the self. This result involved getting rid of certain bodily memories which
would  identify  the  individual  to  himself”  (emphasis  added).  But  wait.  Why  is  there
anything pathological  about leaving behind a part  of  the (more comprehensive)  self,
which is associated with one “I”-“me”? Why is it not healthy to favor a new self – call it
the  Western  Self  –  even  it  if  involves  forgetting  a  part  of  one’s  earlier  (more
comprehensive) self? Why is there a problem with losing memories or their connections,
especially if they helped contribute to a personality split, in this case into two “I”-“me”
selves?
28 Mead argues later in the passage that dropping memories is something that we might
wish to do. “We would be glad to forget certain things, get rid of things the self is bound
up with in past experiences.” From this vantage point losing memories or no longer
organizing them as a self  need not be viewed negatively.  In fact not retaining selves
appears to be quite normal. We have different selves, which depend on social interactions
and their concomitant memories, and we often drop or displace them when we enter new
situations.  Presumably  the  memories  associated  with  them  become  reorganized  or
forgotten.  Yet  Mead referred to  the professor’s  forgetting as  pathological.  From this
perspective, it does not seem that we should divest ourselves of a dimension of who we
were. Mead also tells us that if we “forget everything involved in one set of activities,
obviously we relinquish that part of the self.” Notice the last phrase here, “we relinquish
that part of the self,” which of course suggests that there was a more comprehensive self,
and we have now lost part of it, as well as its former unity.33 So here is the conundrum:
Mead’s understanding of the social self would suggest that forgetting “parts” of the self,
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elementary selves, is at times to be expected, yet there is something pathological about
the loss of memory associated with a split personality, although we are all in a certain
sense split personalities with multiple social selves.
29 There is, of course, a danger of over interpreting a passage of this sort, especially given
that it is drawn from an edited work. Nevertheless, I want to argue that Mead’s language
about  the  pathology  of  forgetting  and  his  highlighting  of  bodily  memories  reflects
something important about his views. The invocation of the life path of a specific person,
with specific bodily memories, opens the door to another possibility for interpreting the
unity of the self and for understanding the potentially pathological dimension of a split
personality.34
30 In spite of Mead’s claims about composite unified selves, there seems to be at least one
lacuna in this account of the unity of the self, even if selves involve past or imagined
communities, and it relates to our professor of education. Mead assumes that there is a
unity to the self or the individual because he takes for granted that we have biographies. 
What is accessible only to that individual, what takes place only in the field of his
own inner life,  must be stated in its relationship to the situation within which it
takes place. One individual has one experience and another has another experience, and
both are stated in terms of  their  biographies;  but there is  in addition that which is
common to the experience of all. (MSS: 33; emphasis added)
31 For Mead, (auto)biography is uniquely human. Animals cannot have biographies. They
certainly have memories but they cannot have biographies as we experience them. And
the reason is obvious.  Other animals are incapable of reflection,  which depends on a
conscious use of symbols.35 Our lives can have a unity or continuity because we have the
ability to use language to reflect on and organize our memories. We have the capacity to
be aware and act, which are functions of the “I,” and we can recall and reflect on the
actions of the “I.” When they are organized in relationship to a generalized other, they
become a “me.” When they are organized in relationship to memories that interest us,
and perhaps anticipated and imagined futures, they become features of a biographical
self, as do memories of affective experiences.36 
We do inevitably tend at a certain level of sophistication to organize all experience into that
of  a  self. We  do  so  intimately  identify  our  experiences,  especially  our  affective
experiences, with the self that it takes a moment’s abstraction to realize that pain
and pleasure can be there without being the experience of the self. Similarly,  we
normally organize our memories upon the string of our self. If we date things we always date
them from the point of view of our past experiences. We frequently have memories that
we cannot date, that we cannot place. (MSS: 135-6; emphasis added)37
32 Note Mead’s words, “We do inevitably tend at a certain level of sophistication to organize
all experience into that of a self,” and “we normally organize our memories upon the
string of our self. If we date things we always date them from the point of view of our past
experiences.” Although one could argue that he is talking about a specific social self here,
a more natural interpretation is that he is defaulting to a set of assumptions about the
individual having a biography, a self, that includes memories of the affective, as well as of
actions and events.
33 Why would we unify our memories in this fashion? No doubt there is more than one
reason, and the reasons may differ, as do narratives, from culture to culture. But from a
Meadian vantage point, we can look to the continuous experiences of unity that we have
owing  to  circumscribed  and  composite  social  selves.  These  selves  would  provide
compelling exemplars for unifying other aspects of our experience. Perhaps narrative is
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in part born of a habit to unify experience that is grounded in the recurrent presence of
organized social selves.38
34 It has become fashionable to speak of the self in terms of a narrative, a life-story. We find
philosophers of  different stripes,  as  well  as  psychologists,  across  a  wide spectrum of
traditions  doing so.39 Of  course this  does  not  prove that  this  is  how we should best
understand ourselves. It does, however, give Mead a viable option, one that would not
undermine his other assumptions about the self. On the one hand, he could acknowledge
an individual’s traits and characteristics, which relate to our impulsive and habitual sides,
without claiming that they are a source of unity in and of themselves, because they are
not systemically organized. On the other hand, he can still argue that social groups and
communities provide the systemic organization necessary for giving rise to selves. But he
does not have to stop here. He can also say that individuals link selves together, along
with their novel responses to events, to generate biographies, life-stories, narratives. An
inability to weave together memories, selves, and the transitions between them leads to a
pathological splitting of the personality, to an incoherent biography, to ultimately no
biography  at  all,  which  would  certainly  make  being  in  agreement  with  oneself  an
evanescent phenomenon.
35 Recall  the  problem that  Dewey  claimed  had  engaged  Mead  in  his  earlier  years:  the
relationship  between  private  experience,  the  subjective,  and  that  which  is  public,
objective. Mead went on to provide a genetic account of the self that sought to show how
private perspectives are known through reflection, a capacity that arises through a social
process. He also sought to provide an account of the mechanisms for integrating novel
events into existing systems,40 which relates to the issue of how “subjective” perspectives
can become “objective” ones, that is, how that which is novel and unique can become
conceptually accessible to a community. But without considering personal narratives, a
significant portion of private experience, which can relate to public life in various ways,
would be difficult to fathom. Further, without a “biographical self” it would be difficult to
make sense of some of the ways in which Mead speaks about self-realization and self-
assertion, for example, our desire “to recognize ourselves in our differences from other
persons. […] [which may include–M. A.] manners of speech and dress, to a capacity for
remembering, to this, that, and the other thing – but always to something in which we
stand out above people.”41 It  would also be difficult to explain the weight that Mead
appears to give to the connection between the obligation to keep one’s word and self-
respect in the quotation that began this article.
36 My suggestion is that Mead had an undeveloped narratological account of the self that
allowed him to make claims that were in line with his rather robust sense of what is right
and proper for a human being to achieve, at least in the modern Western world. Viewing
the self in terms of narrative need not challenge Mead’s pluralistic usages of the term
self. It complements them by providing an overarching framework that allows us to make
sense of how memories and multiple selves are bound together, supplying a unity more
comprehensive than the composite social self. It also assists us in making sense of Mead’s
claims about the pathological nature of certain kinds of split personality. Whether Mead’s
systemic orientation to the self, combined with his sensitivity to novelty, would provide
sufficient tools for the development of a satisfying narratological account of the self is
interesting question. It is a question for another article, as is the question of whether
narrative in its various incarnations, along with other aspects of the individual spelled
out by Mead, are sufficient to supply us with a satisfactory account of personhood. 
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NOTES
1. G. H. Mead, (1934), Mind, Self and Society. Henceforth, MSS.
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2. Noteworthy books that address Mead’s philosophy and understanding of the self include: Cook
1993;  Joas  1985;  Miller  1973.  For  additional  resources,  see  the  bibliography  for  the  article,
“George Herbert Mead,” in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3. Mead begins his article, “The Social Self,” with the following assertion. “Recognizing that the
self cannot appear in consciousness as an ‘I,’  that it is always an object, i.e., a ‘me,’ I wish to
suggest an answer to the question, What is involved in the self being an object?” (1964: 142).
4. On the relationship between the novel “I” and the conventional “me,” see MSS: 209. Mead
claims,  “The ‘I’  both calls  out  the ‘me’  and responds to  it.  Taken together they constitute  a
personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with
these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious
responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience” (MSS: 178). 
5. Mead tells us that, “It is a structure of attitudes, then, which goes to make up a self, as distinct
from a group of habits.  We all  of us have, for example, certain groups of habits,  such as the
particular intonations which a person uses in his speech. […] There are whole bundles of such
habits which do not enter into a conscious self, but which help to make up what is termed the
unconscious self” (MSS: 163). Regarding the relationship of the body to the self, Mead states, “It
[the self-M.A.] is a social entity that must be related to the entire body, and only insofar as the
self is related to the body is it related to the environment. […] The self involves a unity; it is there
in the social process, but there is no self unless there is the possibility of regarding it as an object
to itself. It is the center about which the individual is organized, and the body is an integral part
of the self. […] When we try to regard ourselves independently of our organisms […] we may be
put into an asylum. […] We are thus tied to the body insofar as we have a self” (Mead 1982: 148).
6. Mead (1964: 147).
7. See Mead’s  praise  of  James’s  chapter  on the self  in,  “Social  Psychology as  Counterpart  to
Physiological Psychology,” in Mead (1964: 96). 
8. James (1950: 292).
9. For example, regarding self-assertion, Mead states, “We have, of course, a specific economic
and  social  status  that  enables  us  to  so  distinguish  ourselves.  We  also  have  to  some  extent
positions in various groups which give a means of self-identification, but there is back of all these
matters a sense of things which on the whole we do better than other people do.  It  is  very
interesting to get back to these superiorities, many of them of a very trivial character, but of
great importance to us. We may come back to manners of speech and dress, to a capacity for
remembering, to this, that, and the other thing – but always to something in which we stand out
above people” (MSS: 205). It should be noted that Mead stresses that superiority need not be
understood  in  a  crude  hierarchical  manner.  “This  sense  of  superiority  does  not  represent
necessarily the disagreeable type of assertive character, and it does not mean that the person
wants to lower other people in order to get himself into a higher standing” (MSS: 205). 
10. See, Aboulafia 2011. 
11. John Dewey (1932: xxxvi). 
12. At the close of the chapter on “The Stream of Thought” in the Principles of Psychology, James
discusses the split between the “me” and the “not-me.” See James (1950: 289).
13. At times it appears as if Mead adheres to a position similar to Epictetus’s, but we will see that
this is not the case. For example, Mead tells us that, “The proudest assertion of independent
selfhood is  but the affirmation of a unique capacity to fill  some social  role.” George Herbert
Mead, “National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness,” in Mead (1964: 357).
14. Brian Johnson (2012: 125-45). This is Johnson’s translation and interpolations, p. 125. 
15. Johnson (2012: 126). 
16. Johnson (2012: 126).
17. Johnson (2012: 136).
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18. Epictetus “is grappling with an important philosophic problem about how the unity of Stoic
virtue maps onto the messy pluralities of real life. He deploys the human role to capture the
unity of virtue and specific roles to capture the particularities of daily life” (Johnson 2012: 144).
19. Hannah Arendt (1993: 220) is citing Plato from the Gorgias: 482. For Arendt, agreement with
oneself  involves  an  inner  dialog.  The  voices  engaged  in  this  dialog  must  not  remain  in
contradiction, but how much tension can still exist between them, when harmony or agreement
is achieved, is a topic for another paper. 
20. MSS: 149-64.
21. MSS: 154. Mead continues, “The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole
community. Thus, for example, in the case of such a social group as a ball team, the team is the
generalized  other  in  so  far  as  it  enters  –  as  an  organized  process  or  social  activity –  into  the
experience of any one of the individual members of it” (MSS: 154; emphasis added).
22. Mead (1982: 163). Notice that Mead is equating “the personality” and “self” here. He does this
in other places, see, for example, p. 210 and note 31 below. 
23. It’s worth noting that it is possible to lose a self that we once had, while retaining sensible
experiences that were once associated with this self. In such a situation the individual “becomes
a different personality.” “If we had no memory which identifies experiences with the self, then
they would certainly disappear so far as their relation to the self is concerned, and yet they
might continue as sensuous or sensible experiences without being taken up into a self. That sort
of a situation is presented in the pathological case of a multiple personality in which an individual
loses the memory of a certain phase of his existence. Everything connected with that phase of his existence
is gone and he becomes a different personality. The past has a reality whether in the experience or
not, but here it is not identified with the self – it does not go to make up the self” (MSS: 170;
emphasis added). 
24. Mead (1982b: 77-8). According to Dmitri Shalin these lectures were actually given in 1912.
See, Shalin 2015.
25. Mead (1982b: 74). The term “natural” here does not refer to the biological. Mead is addressing
how inner social consciousness relates to “the organization of the outer world” (Ibid.: 74).
26. For example, in MSS: 265, Mead states, “He may belong to a small community, as the small
boy belongs to a gang rather than to the city in which he lives. We all belong to small cliques, and
we may remain  simply  inside  of  them.  The  ‘organized other’  present  in  ourselves  is  then a
community of a narrow diameter. […] [T]he boy gets a larger self in proportion as he enters into
this larger community.” 
27. Mead (1982b: 74-5).
28. See, for example, the beginning lines of “The Social Self” above, note 3. 
29. See, note 4, above. Mead sought to understand the relationship of the spontaneous responses
of the “I” to the organized “me.” In my view, it can best be understood in light of Mead’s account
of sociality and emergence. For Mead, systems manage to adjust to novel events, for example,
when a new species is introduced into an eco-system. There is a state betwixt and between an old
system and a new one, which Mead refers to as one of sociality, using the term in a specialized
sense. The “me” may be thought of as a system. When the “I” acts in a novel way, the organized
“me”  may  in  reaction  undergo  modification.  If  it  does,  a  new  unified  system,  a  new  “me,”
emerges. See, Mead on sociality and emergence in The Philosophy of the Present, for example, Mead
1932b: 1-2, 47-9. 
30. See, above, p. 203 and notes 5 and 6. 
31. Mead is not distinguishing between “personality” and “self” here and I am following his lead. 
32. Mead notes that, “A multiple personality is in a certain sense normal, as I have just pointed
out. There is usually an organization of the whole self with reference to the community to which
we belong, and the situation in which we find ourselves. What the society is, whether we are living
with people  of  the present,  people  of  our own imaginations,  people  of  the past,  varies,  of  course,  with
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different individuals. Normally, within the sort of community as a whole to which we belong, there
is a unified self, but that may be broken up” (MSS: 142-3; emphasis added). 
33. And when Mead says that “We often recognize the lines of cleavage that run through us,” to
whom does the “we” refer? To one among many social selves? But such selves would not be in
position recognize this cleavage. They are objects of which we are aware. Perhaps the “we” refers
to the “I” in its role as a “consciousness of” the “me” as an object, which is one of its functions
for Mead? But this would presume that the “I” has the capacity to contrast various social selves,
because  it  possesses  some  sort  of  macroscopic  overview.  There  may  be  something  to  this,
although this is not the way in which the “I” is typically presented. It is first and foremost the
sphere of action and the impulsive, and might be thought of as related to the “me” as matter to
form. “A self is a composite or interaction of these two parts of our natures – the fundamental
impulses which make us co-operating neighbors and friends, lovers and parents and children,
and rivals,  competitors,  and enemies;  on the  other  side  the  evocation of  this  self  which we
achieve when we address ourselves in the language which is the common speech of those about
us. We talk to ourselves, ask ourselves what we will do under certain conditions, criticize and
approve of our own suggestions and ideas, and in taking the organized attitudes of those engaged
in common undertakings we direct our own impulses. These two parts are the matter and the
form of the self, if I may use Aristotelian phraseology” (Mead 1964, “National-Mindedness and
International-Mindedness,” 357-8).
34. Thus far we have found that for Mead: 1) the “me” is the cognizable social self, 2) there is a
composite self, which operates at a higher level of unity than more elementary social selves, 3)
the “I” is the home of the impulsive, spontaneous, and the novel, 4) the self is the “I” and the
“me” in process, 5) the spontaneous or novel responses of the “I” can be integrated into a “me,”
creating a new “me,” which involves the processes of sociality and emergence (see, above, note
29), 6) the self is not the body but there is an unconscious self which is made up of bundles of
habits, and habits are tied to the body, and 7) the self can be referred to as character. Is this a
comprehensive list of factors that relate to the question of the multiplicity of selves and the self’s
unity?  In  addition,  there  is  also  the  possibility  that  the  “I”  might  be  the  source  of  an
encompassing meta-self. This alternative would require that the “I” itself be unified, but this is
no  longer  Mead,  at  least  not  the  Mead  who  can  also  speak  of  the  “I”  as  the  home  of  the
spontaneous, the impulsive, and the source of novelty. Even granting him a great deal of leeway
in describing the various functions of the “I,” to appeal to the “I” as the source of a meta-self
strains credulity; the “I” as a deus ex machina. This said, if the I is viewed as a “stand-in” for the
act, it can be viewed as unifying experience. But this is as an act, not as a meta-self. See MSS: 279. 
35. MSS: 122-3, 132-4.
36. Mead’s comments  on  history  and  biography  are  worth  noting.  “History  is  nothing  but
biography, a whole series of biographies; and yet all of these social sciences deal with individuals
in their common characters; and where the individual stands out as different he is looked at from
the  point  of  view  of  that  which  he  accomplishes  in  the  whole  society,  or  in  terms  of  the
destructive effect which he may have. But we are not primarily occupied as social scientists in
studying his experience as such” (MSS: 36-7).
37. This passage begins, “One must, of course, under those conditions, distinguish between the
experience that immediately takes place and our own organization of it into the experience of
the  self.  One  says  upon  analysis  that  a  certain  item had  its  place  in  his  experience,  in  the
experience of his self” (MSS: 135). 
38. For Mead, we certainly have non-reflective, non-self-conscious experiences. Much of our lives
are lived in this fashion, in a world of pre-reflective habits. But we also regularly experience
having a self. 
39. See, for example, McAdams 2009, location 198-207, Kindle Edition. 
40. See note 29 above. 
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41. MSS: 205. It is possible to interpret Mead as referring only to self-respect and differences
from others in a specific community, but this is unlikely given rest of this passage. See note 9
above. 
ABSTRACTS
After more than seventy-five years of scholarship on Mead’s notion of the self, commentators
still debate the meaning of the term. There are those who argue that it should be understood
primarily as a socially constructed “me,” while others claim that the self is a combination of the
spontaneous “I” and the “me.” In addition, there are those who emphasize facets of the self that
do not fit neatly into either of these two camps. Support for various interpretations of the self
can in fact be found in Mead’s work. This article addresses Mead’s uses of the term, guided by
two questions: what kinds of unity or continuity are characteristic of selves? And is there a form
of unity  –  a  “meta-self”  –  that  can encompass  the types  of  selves  that  we find in Mead? In
response to the second question, it is demonstrated that Mead had a narrative account of the self,
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